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Introduction
Capital mobility is relatively high (see the comprehensive survey by Zodrow, 2010) . However, it is not fully cost free. For example green…eld and even brown…eld investments are characterized by some irreversibility, which reduces mobility after the investment has been undertaken. Another related cause of partial mobility is the existence of "location-speci…c capital", which may be relevant when a resident resides in one place for some time (see, e.g., Wildasin and Wilson, 1996) .
Despite these well-known characteristics, most of the existing literature on tax competition treats capital as fully mobile. If this assumption …ts well with paper pro…ts and intangible assets (see Devereux, 2007) , it is less realistic when tangible assets are considered.
There are a few articles that have dealt with the partial mobility of investment. Among these, Lee (1997) uses a two-period framework where …rms are free to make an investment abroad and in the second period face exit costs. This induces competing governments to intensify tax competition at time 1 and then raise tax rates at time 2. Lee (1997) also shows that time 2's tax rate increase is positively related to the amount of exit costs. Becker and Fuest (2011) assume two types of …rms, mobile and immobile. They then show that the optimal tax policy depends on whether the mobile …rms are more or less pro…table than the average …rm in the economy.
Both articles use a deterministic framework to derive policy implications, although risk is shown to a¤ect the interaction between taxation and investment (see, e.g., Ghinamo et al., 2010) . Like partial mobility, volatility is an important characteristic which is seldom considered. To our knowledge, risk has been analyzed in terms of welfare and the main question raised by the relevant literature is to what extent volatility undermines the welfare state. For instance, Wildasin (2000) argues that increased capital mobility reduces the Government's ability to redistribute resources. 1 On the other hand, Lee (2004) states that capital taxation can be used as an insurance against wage ‡uctuations. To our knowledge, no tax competition article has studied strategic interactions when business conditions change over time because of volatility.
The aim of this article is to investigate …scal policies under both volatility and partial irreversibility (mobility). To do so, we will use an intertemporal 1 neoclassical model with investment irreversibility and depreciation. By letting capital depreciate we make irreversibility partial, in that obsolescence gives some degree of ‡exibility to …rms that can decide whether and when to re-invest.
Moreover, we will apply this investment framework to the well-known tax competition models, developed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) . We will then show that, when a Government raises revenue by means of a source-based tax on capital, the provision of public goods depends on the state of nature and the time horizon. In particular, we will show that in the short-medium term, during a downturn, public goods can be optimally provided. The reasoning behind this is simple: when business conditions get worse, …rms cannot disinvest because of irreversibility (they can only wait for obsolescence). Since capital is given, the source-based tax is equivalent to a lump-sum tax. When however a recovery takes place, taxation discourages capital accumulation and the use of a distortive source-based tax leads to the underprovision of public goods. Results change in the long term. In this case, the distortive e¤ects of taxation vanish, and therefore, public goods can be optimally provided. This …nding is in some ways similar to Sinn's (1991) vanishing Harberger triangle.
The is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a standard neoclassical model with investment irreversibility and depreciable capital. Section 3 examines the provision of public goods, in the short term. Section 4 focuses on the long term. Section 5 summarizes our …ndings and discusses some possible extensions.
The model
Let us focus on a representative …rm, which is subject to a unit tax. For simplicity, we assume that the price of capital is equal to 1. Denoting capital as K t , we assume that the production function is t (K t ), where t is a stochastic productivity variable that follows a geometric Brownian motion
where is the expected growth, is the standard deviation of
, and dz t is the increment of a Wiener process satisfying the conditions E(dz t ) = 0 2 and E(dz 2 t ) = dt: Moreover, the function (K t ) follows the Inada conditions. Finally, the installment of capital is assumed to be irreversible. 2 In order to make our model more realistic, we also introduce capital risk. By assumption therefore, capital lifetime will follow a Poisson process. This means that over any short period dt; there is a probability dt that the activity dies. The importance of this assumption is twofold. On the one hand, it makes our analysis more realistic, by adding an important source of uncertainty, i.e., capital risk 3 (e.g., related to obsolescence). On the other hand, depreciation allows us to make the irreversibility assumption weaker. In other words, we state that as long parameter is positive, irreversible investments is not eternal and that it may be "made"reversible by technical obsolescence. When the investment project expires in fact, the …rm owns a non-depreciable option to restart. As immediate restart may not be profitable, the …rm may …nd it pro…table to wait until rises. With such an option therefore, at the expiration of the project the …rm regains a limited degree of reversibility in its investment strategy.
Given these assumptions our representative …rm chooses the stock of capital that maximizes its after-tax pro…t function:
where is a unit tax on capital. Denoting r as the risk-free interest rate, the …rm's investment activity is described by the following:
The …rm invests when the following marginal condition holds:
where t is the maximum value of the stochastic variable reached until time t,
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 derives the optimal investment policy under irreversibility. As can be seen, investment is optimal when the marginal product t K (K t ) (on the LHS) equates to the marginal cost of investment. It is worth noting that under full investment reversibility the term would vanish (as 1 would go to in…nity) and the optimal investment would be reached when the equality t K (K t ) r+ + r+ (r + ) holds, irrespective of whether a volatile business cycle exists or not. In this case, any business change would lead to investment (disinvestment) when a recovery (recession) takes place. When however, investment is irreversible the e¤ects of the business cycle are asymmetric.
Since
> 1 we can say that the marginal cost of investment is higher under irreversibility. Moreover, volatility has an asymmetric e¤ect. During a market expansion, i.e., when at time t, the variable t is higher than t , investment is made so as to reach equality (3). During a recession, i.e., when t < t , the installed capital exceeds the optimal one but cannot be dismantled. In this case, no action takes place and so we can say that capital is immobile.
Optimal provision of public goods in the short/medium term
Let us now analyze the provision of public goods. To do so, we will use the well-known models developed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) where many small countries compete to attract capital but need to use a source-based tax to …nance the provision of public goods. By assumption, each competing government chooses its optimal …scal policy by maximizing the utility function of a representative citizen, i.e., U (C t ; G t ), where C t and G t are a private and public good, respectively. The private budget constraint is equal to
where is the capital endowment of our representative citizen. Assuming a balanced public budget, the condition
always holds. In order to address the government's policy, let us …rst analyze the e¤ect of taxation on capital accumulation. If the business cycle is expanding and therefore the optimal condition (3) holds, taxation a¤ects investment. This can be shown by di¤erentiating (3) and rearranging:
Given KK < 0; we can therefore say that taxation deters capital accumulation. In this case, the change in public spending, caused by a change in , is equal to dG = K t d + dK t : If however a downturn occurs and so the inequality t < t holds, neither investment nor disinvestment is made (because of irreversibility). Since irreversibility makes capital immobile, we have @Kt @ = 0: Therefore the change in public spending is equal to dG = K t d and we can say that in this latter case, a source-based tax has the same e¤ect as a lump-sum one. To sum up we can write the following
More precisely, in the former case (when t t ) new capital, dK t , is invested and, due to the absence of installment costs, the equality t = t is immediately reached. In the latter case, the productivity variable t is less than t . This means that taxation cannot a¤ect investment (and therefore does not a¤ect the tax base) and the revenue change is simply due to the tax rate change d : Substituting (6) into (7) gives
Let us next calculate the national budget constraint. Using (4) and (5) we have
where
+ r is national income. Therefore, the government's problem will then be:
Using (22) and (23), we thus obtain the following:
Proposition 1 Under investment irreversibility and uncertain obsolescence the marginal rate of substitution between the public and the private good will be equal to:
Proof. See Appendix B.
The reasoning behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. If t < t , no investment is undertaken and given irreversibility no disinvestment occurs. Thus capital is …xed. In this case, tax rate changes have no impact on capital accumulation. Since the source-base tax has the same e¤ect as the one due to lump-sum taxation, public good provision is undistorted. If t = t , namely t reaches or overcomes its previous maximum value, investment is undertaken. In this case taxation discourages capital accumulation and therefore leads to the underprovision of G t .
Let us next study the e¤ect of risk on public goods provision. We can prove that: ; is low (high) enough.
Proof. See Appendix C. The reasoning behind this is that volatility has a twofold e¤ect. On the one hand, it raises the threshold value: this means that, given an initial value t , the inequality s < s (with s t) holds for longer: in other words, the public good is optimally provided for a longer time. On the other hand, for a given threshold value t , the increase in makes s (with s t) more volatile. This implies that the equality s = s (with s t) is expected to hold for longer. So the public good is underprovided. Proposition 2 therefore shows that if the tax rate is high enough, an increase in volatility reduces MRS. This is due to the fact that the former e¤ect dominates the latter, and hence, the tax distortion is moderate. If however is low, results depend on the elasticity of capital with respect to taxation. If capital is moderately sensitive to tax changes, again, the former e¤ect dominates the latter. The converse is true when the absolute value of " is high enough. In this case, an increase in volatility worsens the underprovision of our public good. 6 4 The provision in the long term So far we have focused on the provision of public goods for a given value of t . This implicitly means that we are focusing on short/medium-term e¤ects. In order to analyze tax e¤ects in the long term, let us rearrange the investment rule (3) as follows:
where the marginal product t is a regulated process, according to Harrison When, due to an increase in t ; t reaches^ ; the …rm …nds it pro…table to install new capital. New units of capital decrease the marginal product K (K t ): for this reason t cannot overcome^ . 4 If, however, the inequality t <^ holds, the level of t is too low and no new investment is made. Notice that the existence of a re ‡ecting barrier^ does not mean that there is a …nite rate of accumulation over time. Rather, it can simply cause investment inaction for long periods and sudden investment bursts over short periods.
If a steady state distribution for t exists within the range ( 1;^ ), then it is always possible to obtain the corresponding marginal distribution for K t . As a consequence, we can …nd the long-term average growth rate of K t .
Following Hartman and Hendrickson (2002) and Di Corato et al. (2013) we can prove that:
Proposition 3 For any initial value of capital K 0 , such that (K 0 ; t ) ^ ; the expected long-term average rate of capital accumulation can be approximated as follows:
2 )
Proof. See Appendix D. Proposition 3 shows that the long-term average rate of capital accumulation depends on both the dynamics of t (i.e.
; 2 ); and the characteristics of the production function. In particular, if the production function (K) follows the Inada conditions and the drift parameter is high enough (i.e., >
2 ), the expected long-term growth rate of capital is proportional to ( 1 2 2 ): Otherwise it is nil. As can be seen, if > 1 2 2 , the expected growth rate of capital accumulation depends on the initial amount K 0 , unless the production function is isoelastic. If (K t ) = K t with 2 (0; 1); the long-term growth rate is
and does not depend on K 0 . Using the regulated process (12), we can see that when t hits the barrier, the equality:
holds. This means that, since ln^ is constant, the expected growth of K t on the boundary is driven by ln t : Moreover, since ln t ln t ln^ ln t for all t, we can say that in the long term, the average growth rate of K t cannot be greater than the average growth rate along the boundary. It is worth noting that the rate in (13) is decreasing in the volatility of future values of t : A higher volatility has two distinct e¤ects. First, it pushes the barrier^ upward; second, by increasing the negative skewness of the distribution of , it reduces the probability of the barrier being reached. 5 Both e¤ects reduce the rate of capital accumulation in both the short and long term.
As expected, if 1 2 2 , the process drives away from^ and the rate falls to zero.
It is worth noting that Proposition 3 has an important implication: i.e., in the long run, taxation does not a¤ect capital accumulation. This means that, given the public budget constraint (5), the long-term level of public goods provision is una¤ected by tax competition. Unlike previous work, we have shown that, if > 
Conclusion
In this article we have analyzed the provision of public goods over time, by assuming the partial mobility of capital. More precisely, we have assumed that investment is irreversible but is subject to stochastic obsolescence. In this case, depreciation allows us to consider investments as not eternal. When the investment project expires, the …rm indeed owns a non-depreciable option to restart.
As we have shown the provision of public goods changes over time. In the short term, public goods can be optimally provided during a downturn. In this case, the capital stock is …xed and the source-base tax used in our framework has the same e¤ect as a lump-sum one. Only during expansions, the growth of capital is discouraged by taxation and this leads to underprovision.
In the long term, results are di¤erent. As we have shown, tax competition a¤ects neither capital accumulation nor public good provision. Moreover, only if the expected growth rate of productivity is high enough, public goods are optimally provided.
A Proof of Lemma 1
The …rm's problem is one of choosing the optimal amount of capital:
with dK t 0 for all t: Without installation costs, the rate of growth of capital is unbounded and dK is therefore the investment process. The expectation in equation (14) is conditional on the information available at time zero, accounts for the joint distribution of K t and t and takes into account the irreversibility constraint. 6 Assuming that V (:) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, a solution can be obtained starting within a time interval where no new investment occurs. Applying dynamic programming to (14) and rearranging the equation we can write the …rm's value as
Expanding the right-hand side and using Itô's lemma gives
Di¤erentiating (15) with respect to K t we obtain
. The solution of (16) has the following form
where c is a constant to be found and
are the roots of the characteristic equation (17) is then transparent. The contribution of the Kth unit of capital to the pro…t ‡ow, when the existing stock of capital is K; is given by
Calculating the expected present value of this marginal contribution thus gives:
Let us next introduce the boundary conditions for (17):
where t = fmax 0 s t s g : Equations (18) (17) into (18) and (19), we have the following two-equation system:
Rearranging gives the following investment rule:
This concludes the proof of Lemma 1.
B Proof of Proposition 1
To solve problem (10) let us use the following Lagrangian function
The f.o.c. of (21) are
and
Substituting (24) into (3) gives
Using (23) and (25) we thus obtain
Proposition 1 is thus proven.
C Proof of Proposition 2
Let us di¤erentiate (26) with respect to : If t = t ; we obtain
(27) with
where given (3), we have
and therefore
Using (30) and rearranging (28) gives
Simplifying this inequality we thus obtain
As can be seen, if r > 0; then @M RS @ < 0: If however r < 0; results are ambiguous. Let us the write (31) as follows:
Notice that, given (6) ,the elasticity of capital with respect to is "
: Therefore, we can rewrite (32) as
or equivalently,
This concludes the proof.
D Proof of Proposition 3 D.1 Long-term distributions
Let h t be a linear Brownian motion with parameters and that evolves according to dh t = dt + dz t . Following Harrison (1985, pp. 90-91, and Dixit, 1993, pp. 58-68), the long-term density function for h ‡uctuating between a lower re ‡ecting barrier, a 2 ( 1; 1), and an upper re ‡ecting barrier, b 2 ( 1; 1), is given by the following truncated exponential distribution: Let us next focus on the limit case where a ! 1: In this case, from (27), a limiting argument gives:
Hence, the long-term average of h t can be evaluated as E [h t ] = R h t f (h t ) dh t , where depends on the distribution assumed. In a steady-state this gives: 
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D.2 Long-run average rate of accumulation
Let us next take the logarithm of (12):
By Ito's lemma, ln t evolves according to d ln t = d ln t = [(
2 )dt + dz t ] with ln^ is its upper re ‡ecting barrier. Setting h t = ln t , the random variable ln t follows a linear Brownian motion with parameter = ( 1 2 2 ) and has a long-run distribution with (28) as density function. Solving (30) for ln K (K t ) we obtain:
Let us next calculate the expected value of (31):
Using Taylor's theorem, we can expand K (K t ) around the point K 0 , thereby obtaining:
2 )t ; (32) where
: Given this result we obtain:
Rewriting ln(K t (K 0 )) as ln [x x] and expanding it by Taylor's theorem around the point ( g lnx; g ln x) gives Substituting this approximation into (32) we have:
2 )t
(33) Since by (29) E(h t ) is independent on t, di¤erentiating with respect to t, we obtain:
By the monotonicity property of the logarithm, a level K 0 must exists such that ln K 0 = g ln K and ln (K 0 ) =ln (K 0 ): Therefore, we obtain:
